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Abstract 
 
RFID implants for humans have been used in a variety 
of contexts since their commercial inception in 2003. The 
VeriChip product which typically carries a 16 digit 
number was first marketed as an identification device in 
the ehealth space (e.g. for emergency response), then as 
an access control mechanism (e.g. security), and finally 
as an epayment solution (e.g. the purchase of drinks at 
clubs). This paper investigates the story behind RFID 
implants for club patronage access control and epayment. 
The study uses a two-fold qualitative approach in the 
collection of data for the single case study of the Baja 
Beach Club in Barcelona, Spain. A single semi-structured 
interview was conducted with the IT Manager who 
created the application at the club that utilised the human 
chipping product. The full length interview was conducted 
in Spanish, translated into English, and analysed using 
content analysis. The interview was supported by an 
exhaustive search online for documents that met the 
criteria "Baja Beach Club + implants". The documents 
returned by this search included academic articles, 
government policy documents, publicly accessible blogs 
and media commentary. Search engine results online 
uncovered one other dominant document type- that of 
popular religious literature linking implantable 
microchips in humans to end-time prophecy in the Book 
of Revelation, the last book of the New Testament. The 
findings indicate that despite the successful application of 
RFID implants for club patrons, the complexity of the 
technology during trialability led to its stilted diffusion. 
The paper draws on Roger's (1995) diffusion of 
innovation (DOI) theory to describe the poor uptake of 
the technology for access control worldwide but points to 
the possibility that this is only a short-term trend. The 
paper also ponders on whether the slow rate of adoption 
of humancentric implantables will continue and what 
factors might need to be overcome before widespread 
diffusion can occur. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On the 12th of May 2004, news broke in the United 
States of a club in Barcelona that was implanting patrons 
under the skin with ‘electronic credit cards’ [1]. Put 
simply, an RFID transponder was being inserted into the 
body of a consenting club patron, a unique code 
identifying the individual, which could then be used for 
electronic payment and as an access control mechanism to 
special VIP (very important ‘patron’) only areas. The Baja 
Beach Club in Barcelona, Spain [2] was one of two clubs 
(both carrying the same name) to conduct the RFID 
implant trial. The other was the Baja Beach Club located 
in Rotterdam, The Netherlands [3], although there was 
allegedly a third Baja location implanting patrons in the 
United States. The Baja Beach Club was founded in 1985 
by Mr. Larry S. Spatz [4]. He and two other partners 
developed Baja into the largest nightclub chain in the 
United States and later expanded into Europe, with 
operations in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Holland, 
making it at one time the largest night club chain in the 
world. 
The organisation involved in developing the 
implantable chip for humans was the Verichip 
Corporation [5] (known as ‘CHIP’ on the NASDAQ), 
once a subsidiary of Applied Digital Solutions (now 
known as the Digital Angel Corporation) [6]. Marketing 
plans for the VeriChip began in October of 2002, just over 
a year after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks [7]. One 
of the earliest patent applications in the area of 
implantables for living creatures was filed by Mejia and 
Casey on the passive integrated transponder (PIT) tag 
comprising of an integrated circuit and a unitary core 
(patent: 20020154065) [8]. VeriChip received clearance 
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
distribute its RFID transponder as a medical device in 
October of 2004 [9]. A reclassification request to a device 
of type class II was made by the owner of the VeriChip 
product so there could be a reasonable assurance of safety 
and effectiveness of the device [10]. A single adverse 
event report was submitted to the FDA on the 27 July 
2007 pertaining to the removal of the chip after the bearer 
experienced discomfort at the point of implantation some 
hours after the initial insertion [11]. While the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration provided permission for the 
VeriChip to be fit for use as a device for electronic health 
monitoring, little is known about the commensurate 
jurisdictional authorisation gained in the European Union 
and South America at the time the product was rolled out 
for club patronage and security access control, 
respectively. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
Of all the scenarios [12] that were developed for the 
implantable microchip, the following applications reached 
either a proof of concept or were actually tested in the 
marketplace: identification, emergency response, 
electronic health record (HER) identifiers, club patronage, 
VIP access, epayment, security access, physical perimeter 
access, prison inmate tracking and monitoring, employee 
access control, location services, asset tracking (including 
object-to-subject tracking, and subject-to-subject 
tracking), Alzheimer’s wandering, the collection of 
physiological parameters remotely, glucose and other bio-
drug delivery devices, virus detection etc. What is 
interesting to ponder is why it was a part of an 
international club chain that was chosen as one of the first 
markets to trial the complex technology. The diffusion of 
innovation (DOI) theory [13] can help to frame such 
discourse and will be used here to study the potential 
adoption of a complex product, the implantable microchip 
for humans. 
 
2.1. The Commercialisation of Complex Products 
 
Studies in innovation will always emphasise that a 
technology itself is not a product; that only when a 
technology is linked and implemented for a given 
application or context does it become a fully-fledged 
product. This is especially true of high-technologies which 
are considered complex as they often bear dual 
capabilities as a product and a process. The implantable 
microchip is one such complex technology that relies on a 
system of component devices and processes to function. 
But beyond the complexity in the actual implantable 
“system”, in terms of commercialisation neither the 
technology nor the markets were well-defined or 
understood.  
In the case of the RFID transponder implant for 
humans, the technology has evolved since its original 
inception for animal identification, and the potential 
markets are presently evolving with it over time. There is 
to some degree a process of co-evolution occurring as 
developers and users interact [14]. Developers in the case 
of the implantable device must not be constrained to 
meaning the product developers alone but must include a 
number of stakeholders in the value chain, such as the 
manufacturers, application developers, network access 
providers, third party equipment providers, ehealth 
professionals (i.e. conducting the implantation), 
government agencies etc. And users are not merely 
people, but can include organisations that provide end-
users with the opportunity to receive an implantable chip 
for a given application, and these can be merchants (e.g. 
potential issuers) or organisations where end-users hold a 
private interest (e.g. clubs). 
In investigating the potential adoption of microchip 
implants for humans, forecasting on the basis of 
functionality or performance would have been futile. Even 
doing a technical comparison between alternative 
technologies, such as weighing up epayment solutions 
against several techniques like magnetic-stripe card, smart 
card and biometric payment solutions would not provide 
any foolproof evidence for predictive analysis. We have 
long known of the insecurities of magnetic-stripe cards for 
credit card payments, and yet the adoption of smart cards 
has been relatively slow in markets like the United States 
and Australia. Simply because the performance of smart 
cards is known to outstrip magnetic-stripe cards for credit 
card payments, it has not meant an immediate shift in 
market share of card technology types worldwide. There 
are therefore two parts to the puzzle- the first is certainly 
to look at the pros and cons of adopting one technology 
over another alternate technology, but then to consider 
how target customers might react in a behavioural sense. 
In the case of the trial of microchip implants for Baja 
Beach club patrons in Spain and The Netherlands, what 
we have witnessed is the implantation of only one of 
numerous application types (a specific technical 
segmentation) against a single customer type (club patrons 
fitting a certain demographic) tested over several 
jurisdictions. In the case of the Baja Beach Club in 
Barcelona, Spain, not more than 100 people were 
implanted for VIP access and epayment, thus the technical 
segmentation was conducted on a very small group of 
users. The need to analyse the same product in several 
jurisdictions was to identify the similarities and 
differences in the user requirements. Comparing the 
behaviours of club patrons in Spain and The Netherlands 
(i.e. both European Union member states and typically 
consisting of patrons of the same demographic) meant that 
behaviours in adoption could be analysed between 
markets. Thus, by combining technical segmentation by 
application with behavioural segmentation by critical 
success factors, a big picture view begins to emerge about 
the likelihood of commercialising the implantable 
microchip. 
An outcome of the microchipping of club patrons 
proved to reaffirm what is widely reported in the 
innovation literature; that risk is central to the buying 
process for complex products. This is especially true of 
automatic identification and location-based services which 
can be considered as both a product and process [15]. 
Consider what happened in the case of Baja Beach Club 
in Spain. A patron visiting the club was provided with the 
opportunity to have an implant to access VIP areas and 
conduct electronic payments. To actually buy-in to the 
implantable product each individual would have to 
evaluate the risks. Risk can be defined as “a function of a 
buyer’s level of uncertainty and the seriousness of the 
consequences of the decision to purchase” [14]. For a 
product that can be considered completely new besides its 
use-case in animals or nonliving things, it can be assumed 
that the perceived risks as they pertained to end-users 
were deemed prohibitively high. 
The main points surrounding the perceived risks of 
patrons were almost certainly associated with implanting 
high technology beneath the skin, the ability to be tracked 
and monitored or have confidential information lost, 
potential health exposures of implanting an integrated 
circuit, the reliability and performance factors, the ease of 
removing the device in the future, and personal 
philosophical, cultural or religious clashes with the 
symbolism imbued by an implantable for anything other 
than prosthetic requirements. Thus we can separate the 
perceived risks into two main categories- those pertaining 
to performance risk, and those pertaining to psychological 
risks. In the case of the VeriChip product application 
trials, both performance and psychological risks were 
found to be present. 
 
2.2. Characteristics Affecting the Diffusion of 
Innovation 
 
When analysing the characteristics affecting the 
diffusion of implantable microchips for club patrons, one 
needs to question the original motive behind the roll-out 
of the technology. Was it a market research study [16], 
was it a trial of a prototype, or was it adoption at the 
“innovators” stage of the diffusion process? One might 
also play the devil’s advocate and ponder that it had 
nothing to do with any of these motivations, but rather 
gaining mind-share in the general public regarding the 
feasibility of future services based on implantable devices 
for health and non-health initiatives. The media had a 
great role to play in popularising implantable microchips, 
a great story bordering on the science fiction, only this 
time it was reality. A story being sold on the grounds that 
it was now a real possibility for future generations, at 
least, to do away with plastic cards towards a real cashless 
society.  
Rogers’ [13] five perceived attributes of innovations 
provide a vehicle for discussion with respect to 
implantables for humans, and their current rate of 
adoption. Relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, 
trialability and observability are the five aspects of 
implantable technology for humans that will be explored 
in the main body of this paper. These attributes should act 
to shed light on why the uptake of implantable solutions 
has been so low for access control applications. The paper 
will also ponder on whether the slow rate of adoption will 
continue and what factors might need to be overcome 
before widespread diffusion can occur. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The methodology used to explore the 
commercialisation of RFID implants for access control 
was that of a single case study. Exploratory research in 
innovation is about understanding the background context, 
and to crystallize problems associated with new 
technologies, and their prospective impact and benefit to 
society [17]. One of the primary aims of conducting 
exploratory research pertains to diagnosing a situation, 
beyond discovering new ideas. The case study method 
investigates a single situation intensively. It does not seek 
to generalise but to observe phenomena which might shed 
light on the current situation and may be used as a trigger 
for further research. 
 
3.1. Case Study Method 
 
A single case study will be presented in this paper of 
the Baja Beach Club located in Passeig Maritimo de la 
Barceloneta, Barcelona, Spain. The case will focus on the 
implementation of microchip implants for patrons of a 
single Club, despite that there were several other clubs in 
the chain that also deployed similar RFID-implant 
systems. The Baja Beach Club in Barcelona, was that club 
which received by far the greatest amount of attention by 
the western media, between 2004 and 2008. It should be 
noted that the premises is now under new management 
and the implant scheme has been discontinued. 
The data collected for the case study was provided by a 
single semi-structured interview and exhaustive online 
document collection. The data was analysed using content 
analysis software and presented in a narrative form. 
Rogers’ five perceived attributes of innovation were used 
to frame the findings of the study. 
 
3.2. Semi-structured Interview 
 
The semi-structured interview was conducted with the 
former employee of Baja Beach Club who was 
responsible for the actual implementation of the RFID 
implant system at the Barcelona club. The interviewee had 
the role of Information Technology Manager, was a 
Spanish citizen, a male aged 31 years of age at the time of 
the interview, and who did not possess tertiary level 
qualifications. The young male was a self-taught web 
designer, clearly talented and self-assured of his skills, 
and had other business interests besides working at the 
Club. The semi-structured interview took place in 
Barcelona City, on the 4th of June, 2009, and took 45 
minutes to complete during the interviewees lunch hour. A 
translator was present, as the interviewee had only a 
working knowledge of English. The interview mainly 
focused on gathering facts about the Baja Beach Club 
establishment [18]. Furthermore, the interview aimed at 
learning about people’s beliefs and perspectives relating 
to the voluntary implantation of patrons at Baja Beach 
Club and the specifics of the creation, design, 
implementation, operation and maintenance of the RFID-
based system. There were also questions pertaining to 
feelings and motivations behind the roll-out of the 
application, and management perceptions of the 
advantages and disadvantages, risks and benefits of the 
system to patrons and Club owners. The broad themes 
addressed can be seen in Figure 1. The interview was 
transcribed and translated by a final year American 
undergraduate information technology student who held a 
minor in Spanish from Indiana University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Themes addressed in the interview with the 
former IT Manager of the Baja Beach Club in 2009 
 
 
3.3. Documentary Online Secondary Data 
 
The online documentation search was conducted using 
an iterative process [19]. The main search used to gather 
the greatest number of relevant documents was “Baja 
Beach Club + implants” which returned over 7,000 
individual results using the Google Search Engine. Of 
these total documents, only 2% were considered to fall 
into the following categories: academic or conference 
paper or presentation, industry/trade news or magazine, 
government policy and position papers, traditional online 
news media. In the second stage of the online search 
process, documents pertaining to a social, religious, 
philosophical or cultural basis were drawn from the 
results, yielding a significant portion of hit results. It must 
be emphasised that there was a great deal of duplication of 
online documentation, cross-posted to blogs for instance. 
Duplicates were removed and not included in the content 
analysis so that bias was not introduced in the sample size. 
The results of the documentation pertaining to the social 
context within which RFID implants are perceived is in no 
way meant to be representative of the consensus on the 
applicability of such systems for non-medical purposes. 
However, we can point to the issues raised by authors of 
such materials, as being important, albeit to one or more 
sub-groups. 
 
 
4. The Case of Baja Beach Club in Spain 
 
4.1. Chipping Club Patrons 
 
The Baja Beach Club implementation of the radio-
frequency identification (RFID) transponder acted to 
allow club patrons to pay for items purchased with a 
‘swipe’ of their hand (epayment solution), and also to 
allow implantees to access Very Important Persons (VIP) 
zones within the club. The implant service for patrons was 
launched in August 2004 with only 12 persons adopting 
the solution by year-end [20], and implantation occurring 
on Tuesday evenings. Although widely cited in the 
secondary online data that becoming a VIP patron by 
being implanted cost about 100 euro dollars, the IT 
manager stated in the interview that participants in the 
service were not charged to be implanted, given they 
would often spend a great deal of money at the Club 
anyway and so charging extra for implantation hardly 
made sense.  
The decision to deploy RFID transponder implants to 
patrons came from the young manager of the Club, Mr 
Conrad Chase, who had previously visited the United 
States and heard about the use-case of implants in the 
medical field, especially for the elderly and sick (mainly 
for identification purposes). He considered the possibility 
of implanting club patrons in Spain and believed the idea 
would be of commercial value, even if all it did was to 
generate discussion via word-of-mouth between patrons 
and tourists to the area, thus creating an aura around the 
brand, and acting to generate revenue by drawing large 
crowds. The implants were also used by staff at the Club 
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to provide access control to various sections of the Club, 
thus ensuring additional security and the ability to do 
away with keys. A picture of the refurbished establishment 
can be found in Figures 2-3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Front/rear street-level access to Baja Beach Club  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Interior and beach-level access to Baja Beach 
Club 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Relative Advantage 
 
According to Rogers, “[r]elative advantage is the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as being better 
than the idea it supersedes” [13]. Certainly for the product 
and application developers of the human implantable 
microchip, the technology superseded credit cards and 
other paper-based or biometric-based access control 
mechanisms to VIP zones. In terms of relative advantage 
with respect to economic terms, it was perceived by 
management initially that there would be a saving in time 
and effort to grant access to VIP patrons in particular 
zones. It was also noted that the ease of using the device 
to pay for purchases at the Club was so effortless, that it 
might indeed act to an increase in sales as no physical 
cash in the form of notes or coins was actually being 
exchanged. However, this also meant that by offering an 
implant-only epayment solution that the solution had to be 
as ubiquitous as normal credit or electronic funds transfer 
at point of sale (EFTPOS) facilities on the premises. So 
initial start up costs, besides the existing cash register 
were a reader to read the RFID implant, and a computer 
that could run the epayment application at each point of 
sale (POS), along with specialist training to staff to use 
the equipment.  
Speaking in terms of relative advantage with respect to 
non-economic factors, e.g. social factors, the implant 
solution was supposed to offer implantee patrons an 
unrivalled convenience when compared to any other club 
in Barcelona. The convenience would come from not 
having the requirement to carry cash or credit on oneself 
or a physical purse. It also meant that clothing worn to the 
club did not need to have pockets. This was perceived to 
be of greater benefit to females whose apparel generally is 
not fitted with secure deep pockets for aesthetic reasons. It 
also meant that patrons enjoying the summertime on the 
beach till late, could walk into the club without having to 
worry about bags being stolen or otherwise. It is not 
uncommon to find club patrons today who have attached 
valuable items such as passports or driver’s license and 
credit cards in secret pockets in the inner lining of 
garments or in a sentinel jacket that is connected to the 
person via a necklace. 
The social prestige of being an implantee was obvious 
when the IT manager noted: “[o]ur implanted patrons 
would have access to special VIP areas, and when they 
walked into the club, their name would automatically flash 
up on a big screen and a loud beep could be heard echoing 
throughout the club… the reaction by the other clubbers 
was always ‘Oh, look, so and so is here and he is bearing 
an implant in his body’, or ‘Ah, here comes that person 
again, he is special’. It was quite interesting to sit back 
and watch peoples’ reactions… it was at times quite 
amusing really… but the implantee patrons, really loved 
the extra attention, and people would instantly go up to 
them and talk to them and strike a conversation about 
anything… they were no longer anonymous, but were very 
approachable because people knew their name.” Obvious 
from this excerpt is that there was a fair bit of the ‘cool 
factor’ involved in this type of prestige. The IT Manager 
believed it brought these VIP patrons ‘instant’ reward, in 
terms of prestige. He noted: “[t]hey were different and 
there was an attraction in that… our VIP patrons were 
pretty big spenders, they had a sizeable budget… so if 
your name flashed up on the screen, pretty much, people 
knew you were quite wealthy.” 
But it should be noted that relative advantage indicates 
not only the benefits but the costs resulting from the 
adoption of an innovation. While the humancentric RFID 
application did not take long to design, implement, test 
and operate, i.e., not more than three months in total, the 
costs of operating a dual epayment solution was not 
insignificant, when one considered that it took several 
persons with different skill-sets to register and enroll an 
 
 
individual patron onto the RFID-based system. About the 
only limitation that the IT manager noted of the club 
patron implant identification system “was that the 
enrolment process was very messy and required all these 
people to come together so that just one patron could be 
registered. It was … very disruptive to add a new patron 
to the program. You needed a doctor or nurse, you needed 
a Club employee who had been trained in the process of 
registration (and most of the time it was me needing to be 
available to do the data entry and make sure it was all 
working as it should be), you needed the patron to make 
sure they wanted to participate in the trial, and that some 
kind of light anesthetic would be applied so the person 
would not feel any pain… It is just not viable as a 
business process, as there are too many costs involved.” 
Generally, the greater the perceived advantage of using 
the innovation, the faster the rate of its adoption [21]. 
 
5.2. Compatability 
 
When a company launches a new product it does so 
with the knowledge that in some markets it will be more 
compatible than others; that is, ultimately there will be a 
higher penetration of a given innovation in some markets 
before others. Compatability is about the degree to which 
an innovation is perceived to match the existing values, 
past experiences, and needs of potential adopters [13]. In 
the case of microchip implants for humans for access 
control, the perception is of a less compatible and more 
uncertain innovation. And perhaps here is the reason, why 
several different market locations were strategically tested 
in Europe using implantable microchips. The uptake of 
the implantable solution at the Baja Beach Club in Spain 
suggests that the product was incompatible with the 
sociocultural values and beliefs of the Spanish consumers 
(figure 4).  
While “[y]oung people love new technology” as 
echoed by the IT Manager, the whole implantable product 
for humans seems to have ignored a simple rule in the rate 
of adoption of a new innovation, that if the technology is 
not compatible with sociocultural value and beliefs it will 
almost certainly fail. In the case of the microchip implant, 
a plethora of online secondary data resources indicate a 
belief that the implant is somehow linked to the fulfillment 
of prophecy in the Book of Revelation. Figure 4 shows the 
“beast” concept which is highlighted with direct allusion 
to chapter 13 verses 16-18 where the charagma is 
described, a mark on the right hand or forehead. While the 
authors do not claim for a moment that this type of end-
time theology is embraced by all Christian groups, there is 
a part of the broader community that is opposed to a 
foreign object being implanted into the body, especially 
for access control or payment of any kind. 
There is a second type of movement that is identified in 
the secondary online data sources which unlike the 
stereotyped “religious fundamentalists”, often are 
considered as either conspiracy theorists or engaging with 
an underground rebellious resistance movement such as 
anti-government revolts to globalization (e.g. against the 
G8). There is a complex mesh of voices in this subgroup- 
some pertain to the upkeeping of human rights, others to 
the enactment of legislation to guard against enforced 
chipping of humans, and still others very suspicious of the 
role the government is playing in surveillance of its 
citizens. At the heart of the compatability problem is the 
struggle of people to ensure their information remains 
private and in countering the power-control issue evident 
in relations between citizens and their state. If these 
compatability issues are to subside over time to enable the 
adoption of RFID implants for humans in a variety of 
applications (not just club patronage), then it will take 
“time”, it will depend on context, market and “place”, and 
for the public to become more educated on the symbolic 
and real “meaning” of the “identification number”. For 
now at least, the fine print is missing and the details are 
absent on how the technology may become an enabler or 
disabler. The question the content analysis raises, is 
indeed, how an implant ID used for a given application, 
may be misused into the future, and what the implications 
are for all concerned, especially for long-term tracking 
and access to services of all kinds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Content Analysis of Internet-blogging about Baja 
and the RFID implant service directly describing issues 
pertaining to socialcultural values. 
 
 
Given that an average uptake of the implantable 
microchip at Baja Beach Club Spain, amounted to only 22 
patrons per annum on average, it is the opinion of the 
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authors that the rate of adoption was affected by not only 
sociocultural values but also a mismatch of product to 
client needs, and even as a result of a more effective 
previously introduced club innovation for epayment and 
access control such as biometrics. It is generally perceived 
in the literature that compatibility with existing values and 
norms is of far greater importance than compatibility with 
existing practices [22]. Existing practices can be changed 
through a process of mutual adaptation, but values and 
norms are deeply engrained in the individual psyche and 
these are often intentionally applied in the decision-
making process whether they are of a social, religious, 
cultural or philosophical nature [23]. 
 
5.3. Complexity 
 
Of all the attributes of innovations, complexity perhaps 
is the simplest to comprehend. Complexity is the degree to 
which an innovation is considered to be difficult to 
understand or use in a relative sense. For example, a 
technology such as a wooden table can be considered a 
simple innovation when compared to an embedded 
beneath-the-skin advanced technology such as radio-
frequency identification transponder implants. Figure 4 
depicts how every-day people perceive implant systems as 
complex; and how the Baja Beach Club implementation of 
the implantable product was perceived by global members 
of the online community. The main concepts titled, 
“RFID” and “chip” with the dense number of terms 
surrounding them, show the perception of the required 
components by members of the online community with 
respect to epayment and access control system based on 
implantable devices. The online community refers to 
“tags”, “technology”, “devices”, “applications”, 
“products”, “security”, “electronic”, “chips”, “computer”, 
“RFID”, “radio” and “reads”.  
Despite the obvious complexity, when asked whether 
or not the solution at Baja Beach Club required a major 
integration effort, the reply from the IT Manager was: 
“[n]ot at all… it was a small customized system that I 
built. I did not rely on anything more than the RFID 
device, the readers, the antennas, a database to store the 
information collected, and the program I built to register 
patrons on the system and to enable transactions to be 
processed in real-time.” An example of the epayment 
interface built by the IT Manager is presented in Figure 5. 
On the left is a picture showing a computer sitting on a 
stand near a VIP cordoned off area with a screen shot of 
the application, and on the right is a captured screen shot 
conveying how someone purporting to have a Baja Beach 
club implant was not given access to the VIP zone, as his 
read attempt was negative and was indicated by the words 
“NOT OKAY” in the application. Additional complexity 
was increasingly added to the system as in 2006 Baja 
Beach Club recruited a third party organization to assist in 
the target marketing of club patrons [24].  
Despite the IT Manager’s elucidations about the 
simplistic nature of the advanced technology, the matter 
has more to do with understanding how the system works 
and what this means for the individual considering 
implantation. While technologies such as automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) allow people to understand the generic 
“process” of withdrawing funds for example, without 
having the need to know what happens in the back-end 
systems, implantable solutions are yet another leap into 
the unknown. Because the component becomes a part of 
the patron’s body, the individual is no longer just 
“trusting” that the system will work, they most likely want 
to know more details, in the sense of what it means in the 
end-to-end process taking place, and what it means for 
them as a living being. The health domain is somewhat 
different, as patients requiring a heart pacemaker for 
instance, often do not have a choice regarding 
implantation; they just want the pacemaker to work 
because it means they have a chance at surviving. But 
when there are choices and options and alternatives, one is 
a little more skeptical about implanting technologies into a 
completely healthy body. 
 
   
 
Figure 5 The Complexity of the ePayment Solution. 
Courtesy of Drew Hemment, Lancaster University 
 
Technical factors usually contribute to an innovation’s 
complexity- such as how is the implant injected, how can 
it be maintained, and how can it be removed. Indeed when 
asked whether any of the 100 VIP patron implantees had 
requested the removal of the implantable microchip, the 
IT Manager replied: “No, they have not… it is just sitting 
in their body, it cannot do them any harm.” However, 
what if even one club patron had asked to remove the 
chip, what then, and how would this be achieved, and at 
whose expense? Or what if the RFID implantable 
transponder had been rendered dysfunctional, what then, 
simply implant the patron with a second transponder into 
the same location? The absence of standards only acts to 
increase complexity. 
Complexity is present in almost all high technologies 
on the very basis that a great number of these have the 
dual role of product and process. So whether one talks 
about actual components of an implantable system such as 
the one deployed at Baja Beach or the actual processes 
involved with usage-related technical issues over the 
longer term, the complexity is ever-present. No matter the 
kind of advanced technology which is trying to be 
introduced, if it has anything to do with computing, is 
wireless, and implantable, and data is stored remotely, 
then it will come adorned with numerous upfront barriers 
in any vertical sector or market in which it is deployed. 
 
5.4. Trialability 
 
The ever increasing pace of change has had an impact 
on the number of products that are trialed before 
commercial diffusion takes place. Trialability is the 
degree to which an innovation may be tested for a limited 
duration. This can be a valuable process and time for an 
innovation, as developers seek to interact with users, and 
learn from them about their needs, and to identify 
dysfunctional qualities in the product. The trend in the 
high-tech space today is toward limited initial deployment, 
and then for changes to product design to be based on 
early feedback provided by the first adopters who are 
often influential leaders in social networks. This is 
notable, particularly in the luggable and wearable 
computing space. For users it is a type of learning-by-
doing which will hopefully extend to buy-in later. It 
should be noted also, that trialability may act to reduce the 
rate of adoption [21], if the line between desirable and 
undesirable consequences of the innovation cannot be 
distinguished. 
One of the fundamental changes that occurred in 
implanting patrons at Baja Beach was the physical bodily 
location where the implant was to reside. At first, the 
directive by the company supplying the implantable 
solution was to implant in the upper arm of the individual 
but this approach was destined to failure based on early 
patron feedback to do with usability of the system. The IT 
Manager stated: “…to be honest we realized this [the 
upper arm] was not the most convenient location and so 
some people had it implanted on the inside of their wrist. 
This is the site that gives the individual maximum 
mobility and is user friendly. We injected so far as the 
implant could lodge itself in the muscle of the person and 
would not go moving around inside the body to render the 
program useless.” These are the kind of issues that 
extensive trials would have shown, but given the solution 
went straight to market, the issuers of the implant had to 
respond to patron sentiment ‘on the fly’. 
It must also be underscored, that “trialability” with 
particular types of implantable solutions are quite difficult 
if left in the body for a certain period exceeding 3 months. 
In actual fact, volunteering to be a part of a trial might 
mean you are a life-long carrier of an implantable device, 
even if it is dormant, unless extraction via an operation is 
possible. When the IT Manager was asked about the fact 
that the program was now discontinued under new 
management, and whether the implants in the VIP patrons 
were just lying their dormant, he responded: “Yes they are 
dormant and not only that, but they are also quite useless 
now. Even if someone was to chop off someone’s arm to 
use the ID device, they could not get far with it… I have 
changed all the ID entry access codes now- it was very 
simple.” It was clear by this remark that the IT Manager 
was more concerned about the security at the new 
establishment, then the implications of the dormant device 
in the human being. This is perhaps somewhat analogous 
to the gathering of junk in space after many missions, 
except unlike space, the body is a great deal more limited. 
 
5.5. Observability 
 
Observability pertains to how well an innovation is 
received, or communicated to others. In some cases it is 
easy to observe an innovation but in other cases it is 
difficult. In computing the distinction between computer 
hardware versus software programs can be made. 
Generally the less observable an innovation is, the slower 
the rate of adoption. Where the product is less observable, 
as in the case of microchip implants that are inserted 
beneath-the-skin, peers who have already inserted an 
implant can act to propel its uptake by providing “safety 
credibility” [21]. This was indeed the strategy of the chief 
executive officer of the VeriChip Corporation, Mr Scott 
Silverman, who not long after the official approval of the 
VeriChip by the Food and Drug Administration, 
pronounced he was bearing a chip. Potential adopters will 
often seek the advice of those who have lived and 
breathed the technology to derive the full story about the 
positive and negative effects of the device.  
It was never the intention of the owner of Baja Beach 
Club Spain to have a high penetration of VIP implantees, 
as that would simply render the VIP status useless and 
place too many demands on the organization in terms of 
employee tasks. Rather, the Club wanted to use the 
implants as a means to stimulate discussion about the 
club, and in fact, it was very successful in executing that 
strategy. Guide books, even popular ones like Lonely 
Planet, noted the implant application, wrote about it, and 
encouraged travelers and citizens of Spain, to go and find 
out first-hand what all the fuss was about. The IT Manager 
revealed that it “was all about the novelty.... In short, it 
was a marketing ploy, and it actually worked well. We 
strongly believed that despite the high-tech application, it 
was good old traditional word of mouth that would drive 
people to come and participate in the clubbing 
experience.” 
Observability has a great deal to do with how policy 
forms around the technique- high visibility is critical for 
exposure, but it does not always guarantee uptake. In 
some cases, too much exposure can be counter-productive 
to the main aim of the issuing party, especially where 
government policy for instance, has not yet even 
considered what its stance is on a certain device and 
respective applications it enables. The deployment of the 
implantable microchip at the Baja Beach Club in both 
Spain and The Netherlands in 2004, placed pressure for 
an Opinion to be released by the European Union in 2005 
[25]. The assumption was, that in other markets like Asia, 
Africa, or North America there would have been too much 
of a revolt against the technology (e.g. the experience of 
CASPIAN [26]), while Europe was seen as a larger and 
also more complex market with a different governance 
structure, perhaps more easily overcome. 
 
6. Findings 
 
As technology moves faster than the enactment of 
policy and legislation, it is innovation that is now driving 
new levels of technology acceptance. The bombardment 
of the diffusion of new innovations, day after day, at an 
exponential growth rate, has meant that consumers’ 
expectations and their ability to adapt to changes in the 
marketplace have made them more resilient and to some 
extent more akin to the trialability of new ideas. But with 
the onslaught of new inventions, also comes the increasing 
importance of how these technologies can be used, 
beyond their original scope of design. It is this aspect, that 
even in the reports on implants and nanotechnology 
coming from sober sources of secondary data (figure 6), 
that the concerns of people vested with the direction of a 
state’s policy, legislation, law enforcement, bio-ethical 
and health opinions, are similar to those who are generally 
labeled as “conspiracy theorists” or “religious 
fundamentalists” or “human rights activists” or “anti-
globalisation revolutionaries”. The only differentiator in 
the implantables space, is that the so called “conspiracy 
theorist” or “religious fundamentalist” will reach for 
sources of evidence in posing their arguments in 
completely different domains, than those of the 
government policymaker or law reform commission or 
otherwise.  
Despite the inspiration for the argument that different 
groups are putting forward regarding why people should 
or should not be implanted for commercial applications, it 
is important to bring diverse groups of people together to 
debate and discuss what the possibilities might herald, 
what they might mean today and well into the future. 
Ignoring the various voices, or dismissing them as outright 
nonsense, can work to introduce new technologies without 
the commensurate controls or safeguards in place. 
Discussions about human rights, liability and loss, and the 
potential for an invasion of privacy and breakdown of 
trust between organizations and citizens or 
insurmountable control of governments over citizens will 
have major repercussions well into the future. 
We cannot hold to the attitude as possessed by the 
former IT Manager of the Baja Beach Club in Spain, who 
when asked repeatedly about the risks replied: “No. 
Frankly I can only see positive benefits. There are no 
negatives.” However, this kind of thinking does not allow 
for the critical assessment of the social implications- both 
intended and unintended consequences- of emerging 
technologies on society. For example, what might such 
changes mean for the way people live and work and 
interact with one another? Are there potential detrimental 
effects for individuals who bear high tech devices? The 
current development process is for organizations to patent, 
then to clinically test if required, and then to deploy. 
Commercialisation more than ever has become a buzz 
term- if you can conceive, then you can receive the 
rewards, presumably some of this in a monetary form. But 
the successful filing of a patent does not imply that the 
technology can be deployed without further approval. 
Consider the patent for a system and method to 
manufacture a swallowable sensor device of April 2009 
[27]. One need only ponder for a moment on what kinds 
of issues might arise with a sensor device that finds itself 
in the hands of the wrong kind of doctor.  
The risks are present, and words like “consent” and 
“choice” and “opting-out” have almost become 
synonymous with politically correct statements. At least 
for now, we can speak about options and not mere 
compliance or acknowledgement of reception of identity 
devices in differing contexts. And if there was anything of 
magnitude to gain from the case of the Baja Beach Club in 
Spain, it was that patrons were given an option. The Club 
did not say, “be chipped or find another club”, but who 
knows how far off this kind of either/or scenario might 
actually be! We can already see the advent of biometrics 
in club patronage across Australia. The IT Manager 
affirmed the importance of consent- “if people want it 
they can adopt it, if they don’t want it, then that’s that. 
The decision must be with the consumer and not with the 
system creator. We never told anyone at the club- look, 
now you are under our patronage you must take this 
technology. No, never. And for the patrons, I must stress 
again, it was always up to them.”  
On reflecting on worldwide trials, the IT Manager 
stated that while the trials were not large scale there were 
a lot of people looking at the potential. He said: “I always 
like to see where things are at in this space, and often look 
for information related to RFID to note the developments. 
While the vast majority of trials have only had very few 
people in them, nevertheless they have tested the concept 
works…” As for the IT Manager he hopes for a day in 
which he does not have to carry cards at all- “when 
everything is stored on centralized databases, and that my 
ID will be an implant so I do not have to carry around 
cumbersome wallets. I would feel very relieved as a 
consumer if all this would happen. I just want to be free of 
the extras that are a nuisance.” Privacy experts would well 
warn about the perils of maintaining a false sense of 
“freedom”, “security”, and “justice” based around 
convenience solutions which look like they are making 
life easier but instead encroaching on our human rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Secondary Online Data Content Analysis which 
pertains to policy and legal documents and regulations, 
trade magazines, media 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
For now at least, it is the attribute gap, the discrepancy 
between a potential user’s perception of an item of 
knowledge and how the potential user prefers to perceive 
that attribute that is the problem in the rate of adoption of 
human implantable technologies for epayment and access 
control applications. This exploratory research aimed to 
present a single case study of the Baja Beach Club in 
Spain, supported by a single interview with the IT 
Manager of the club who implemented the implantable 
solution, and also secondary online data used to support 
evidence presented. The paper hopes to have conveyed 
the need to conduct pre-tests with all implantable 
solutions that are being patented so that the value of the 
technologies can be enhanced and so that adequate 
safeguards can be introduced in a timely manner. Another 
contribution of the paper was in raising awareness of the 
commercial applications that are sporadically becoming 
available through the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT) humancentric 
implantables. 
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